Holy Light in "Paradise Lost" by Hunter, Jr., William B.
HOLY LIGHT IN PARADISE LOST 
P ERHAPS no passage in all of Pa~adise Lost has been more vigorously debated in recent years than the lines in- 
voking light which open Book 111. In these lines Milton hails 
"Holy Light7' as "offspring of Heav'n first-born," or as "of th' 
Eternal Coeternal beam," or as "pure Etheral stream,/Whose 
Fountain who shall tell?" This Light has existed from before 
the material creation, though how long before Milton does 
not say. He observes that "God is Light," and that God thus 
dwells in this "Holy Light" which he terms the "Bright 
effluence of bright essence increate." But what does the poet 
mean by these grand terms? Does he have in mind the ineffa- 
ble light of Dante? Is this light a degenerating neoplatonic 
emanation? Is it the light of God the Father? Is it physical 
light, the first stage of the distinction of creation? I t  is the 
Son of God? And if the Son, is Milton hesitating between 
an Arian "offspring of Heav'n first-born'' and the orthodox 
coeternality of the Son with the Father? All of these soh- 
tions have been proposed. The answer to the difficult ques- 
tion presented in Milton's lines seems to  me to lie in his sup- 
posedly Arian conception of the Logos-Son. It is niy purpose 
in this paper to outline some of the neoplatonic and patristic 
tradition which lies behind his thinking in this passage and 
then to show that he uses a specific cluster of images there 
which prove that he was addressing the Son of God as Holy 
Light. First, however, it will be necessary to investigate the 
universally held opinion that Milton was an Arian. 
If we accept the argument that Milton beIieved in this 
famous heresy, we imply two rather strange twists in his 
thought. In  the first place, he never supports Arius in his 
works. He does mention him several times but without any 
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suggestion of indebtedness or kinship. Moreover, no con- 
temporary biographer reports any Arian leanings in his con- 
versations. In the second place, Milton was clearly aware 
that his conception of the Son was unusual in the Christian 
tradition of his day (his introductory remarks to Chapter V 
of the Christian Doctrine admit such awareness), but despite 
his fine training in theology he does not seem to realize that 
he is supporting beliefs recognized as heretical. Indeed, the 
Christian Doctrine is addressed to Protestants of all denomi- 
nations in an effort to present a united program for communi- 
cants everywhere. Milton would have been almost incredibly 
naive had he planned a world-wide Protestant movement 
which would consciously include one of the most famous 
heresies of church history. 
What were the issues which Arius had precipitated shortly 
after 300 A.D.? Until his time the church had not taken an 
authoritative stand upon any dogma. It was Arius' misfortune 
to precipitate the first great religious debate of the new 
church-the question of the meaning of the Mystery of the 
Trinity-which was decided finally only by the first great 
Council, held at Nicaea in 32.5. Arius had asserted that the 
Trinity is not composed of equal or of coeternal members, 
At a point in time the Father had created his Son; in doing 
this he had acted of his own free will. Furthermore, the Son 
was created out of nothing-ex ouk mton or ex nihilo, just as 
had been the rest of creation. Herein lay the main issue in 
325: if we worship the Son we are worshipping an entity 
which is not significantly different from the rest of creation. 
In other words, Arianism opened the doors to pantheism. Mil- 
ton accepts many of these details-explicitly in the Christian 
Doctrine and implicitly in Paradise Lost. For him the Son is 
inferior to the Father and he was generated or created or 
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begotten at a point in time as a result of the Father's free 
choice. But Milton's Son was not generated out of nothing: 
he comes from the Father's substance. 
To understand the import of these statements we shall 
have to look first at a trinity once of immense importance to 
Christians but now practically forgotten: that of Platonism. 
For Platonism had its trinity too, which has interested Chris- 
tians in many stages of their history (including some of Mil- 
ton's contemporaries at Cambridge). The origins of this trinity 
are lost to us; certainly it can be deduced from Plato's dia- 
logues only by the most violent wresting of meaning. Plotinus 
presents the theory in its complete form, but it appears in 
one shape or another in every neoplatonist. In the Enneads 
this trinity is named the One, Mind, and Soul. The One, 
which is utterly unknowable, overflows or emanates into 
Mind, which in turn emanates into Soul in a descending 
series. Such an emanation is eternal, Iike the orthodox Chris- 
tian view of the generation of the Son, but it does not, of 
course, produce a co-equal trinity: all neoplatonists agree in 
the fundamental inequality of One, Mind, and Soul. Further- 
more, it is not willed into being. Part of the nature of the 
One is that it must emanate Mind and Soul, as we11 as even 
lower orders. In  Christian eyes the neoplatonic trinity had 
three major failings: it provided in no way for the incarna- 
tion of the Son as Christ; the persons were clearly of unequal 
rank; and the identification of the third member, Soul, with 
the Holy Spirit was at best dubious. Just how much influence 
the pagan system had upon Arius and his followers is dif6- 
cult to say. They are contemporaneous. They are certainly 
similar in their graduated scale of divinity. But the neo- 
platonic trinity is eternal and its subordinate members are 
derived from the substance of the One; the Arian Trinity 
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begins in time and its second person is created out of nothing. 
The neoplatonic is not willed by the One; the Arian is willed 
by the Father. 
Platonism had also come forcefully to an even earlier Chris- 
tian movement by way of the Jew Philo, who had allego- 
ized the Old Testament for his Alexandrian contemporaries. 
The Philonic God, it must be observed first, is quite unknow- 
able (like the neoplatonic One and lilce Milton's God the 
Father). Thus utterly transcendent deity may be known only 
indirectly through his creation. Following Plato, Philo ac- 
cepted the reality of a world of intelligibles. When God de- 
teimined upon the visible creation, he first, as Phi10 says, 
"fully forriled the intelligible world . . . and then, with that 
for a pattern, the world which our senses can perceive."l The 
"intellect" which perceives the intelligible world Philo does 
not call by the neoplatonic term Mind; rather he follows the 
Stoics and denominates it Logos: "the universe that consisted 
of ideas would have no other location than the Divine Logos 
which was the Author of this ordered frame" of the later- 
created, visible ~ n i v e r s e . ~  Philo's conception is evidently simi- 
lar to the opening of the Gospel of John: "In the beginning 
was the Word." In Philo, then, God thinks the ideas of the 
intelligible world. The Mind of God is termed the Logos and 
it is at this stage "identical with the essence of God" and 
does not exist as a separate entity.' 
But the ideas leave the mind of God and take on an ex- 
ternal existence as the intelligible world, no longer identical 
with his essence. The Mind which embraces this intelligible 
world thus also comes into existence as an entity separate 
from God; Philo continues to call this separated Mind by the 
same name that it had when it was part of the divine essence: 
the Logos. The Logos then has, in Harry Wolfson's analysis 
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of Philo7s thought, two stages of existence: a first stage, un- 
created and from eternity, when it exists only as God's 
thought (not as a separate entity); and a second stage when it 
is generated as God externalizes his thought into an intel- 
ligible world. Philo may then speak of this Logos either as 
"created" or as "eternal." It is eternal in that it has existed 
from eternity as a property of God. When it enters its second 
and external stage as an entity it is properly said to be 
created. As such, Phi10 calls it the "eldest and most all- 
embracing of created things."' 
Although Philo's conception of a two-stage Logos is for- 
gotten by most Christians today, it was unquestionably a 
central consideration in the effort of the primitive church 
to establish just what was meant by the Mystery of the Trin- 
ity. Directly involved too was the issue of the divinity of the 
historical Jesus. I t  is easy to demonstrate that many of the 
earliest church fathers-the so-called Apologists-follow Philo 
in his consideration of a two-stage Logos which they apply 
to the Christian Logos-Jesus. Tertullian, for instance, asserted 
that "before all things God was alone." But "even then God 
was not without reason or what is called Logos. But 'as soon 
as it pleased God' to create the world, He 'put forth the 
Logos himself.' "j Accordingly, Tertullian takes the statement 
"In the beginning was the Word" to refer to emanation or 
generation by which the Word entered its second stage of ex- 
istence and became a person separate from the fat he^.^ Like- 
wise Hippolytus argues that "God subsisted 'alone' and had 
'nothing contemporaneous with himself' and 'beside Him 
there was nothing,"' although he had his reason-that is, 
the pre-existence Logos.' Milton thus has good patristic au- 
thority when he has God assert in Pa~'adise Lost that he is 
"alone / From all etelmity" (VIII, 205 f.). These words are not 
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necessarily Arian at all when understood in the Philonic con- 
text, 
Did God will the creation of the Logos when it came to 
exist in its second stage? Again we turn to Philo, who states 
that the "Logos together with the intelligible world came into 
their second stage of existence prior to the creation of the 
world by the will of God."' And again we find the same point 
of view in the early fathers. Tertullian, for instance, argues 
that the generation of the Logos took place "as soon as God 
willed to put forth into their respective substances and forms 
the things which He has planned and ordered within him- 
self."' Similar quotations can be found in Justin Martyr, Ta- 
tian, Theophilus, Hippolytus, and Clement of Alexandria. Mil- 
ton likewise holds in the Christian Dod~ine that "the genera- 
tion of the Son . . . arose from no natural necessity. . . . For 
questionless, it was in God's power consistently with the per- 
fection of his own essence not to have begotten the Son" (XIV, 
185, 187). Or more generally in Paradist? Lost, God asserts 
that "Necessity and Chance / Approach not mee, and what I 
will is Fatey' (VI, 172 f .). 
Was the generation of the Logos eternal? Clearly the 
exponents of the two-stage theory (including the earliest 
fathers) must hold that the actual generation had a begin- 
ning, even though the antecedent Logos as God's thought is 
eternal. On the other hand, the two-stage theory did not 
make any sense in the historical development of neoplato- 
nism, which as we have seen held that Mind had emanated 
continuously from eternity. We may surmise that this neo- 
platonic development led Origen and Irenaeus to argue the 
theory of an eternal, single-stage generation of the Logos, the 
theory which Christians generally hold today. As Origen 
asserts, the generation of the Logos "is as eternal and ever- 
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lasting as the brightness which is produced from the  sun,"'^ 
and "there never was a time when He was not."" Under the 
impact of the new single-stage theory the two-stage one 
slowly disappeared from Christian thought. On the other 
hand, Apologists from Justin Martyr through Lactantius had 
accepted the two-stage theory of the Word, with the irnplica- 
tion in many of them that the Trinity is unequal (as in Philo 
and Plotinus), that the second and third members are in 
some sense not eternal (as in Philo), and that they are gen- 
erated from the divine substance (as in Plotinus). But this 
theory was never formally anathematized; if it had been, we 
would have practically no church fathers until after the 
Council of Nicaea. The movement is recognized now as sub- 
ordinationism, which in its emphasis upon the divinity of the 
three persons of the Trinity is quite different from Arius. The 
single-stage theory which prevails today is actually a later 
development. 
It is necessary now to show Milton's position in the Trini- 
tarian controversy. There is no trace of the neoplatonic One- 
Mind-Soul terminology in the Christian Doctrine or in Para- 
dise Lost, but we should not expect any because of the nature 
of these works and because of the absorption of the ideas in 
Christian terminology. However, Milton's Son is clearly an 
emanation differing in degree from the Father and generated 
from his substance. In common with all Christians, Milton re- 
jects the origin of the Logos out of nothing-whether it be 
the Philonic or Arian interpretation. In doing so he avoided 
the real charge of heresy which could be brought against 
him. On the other hand, he departed from neoplatonism to 
return to the two-stage conception of the Logos which had 
been put forward originally by Philo and then had been ac- 
cepted and expounded by a respectable group of church 
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fathers-among the earliest Christian writers. We may surmise 
that Milton returned to then1 because of a principle which 
has always motivated the thinking of puritan Protestantism: 
the desire to establish church doctrines and practices as close 
as possible to those of the most primitive Christian church. 
Was Milton then an Arian? It seems that we can answer 
with certainty that he was not. Subordinationism as such has 
not been branded heretical, though it is not the view of the 
Trinity found most widely today, or even in the 17th century 
for that matter. As Milton himself observes in the Christian 
Doctrine, his view of the Son agrees with the faith expressed 
in the Apostles' Creed; he might also have added the Nicene 
Creed. The equality of the persons of the Trinity was not 
officially affirmed at Nicaea; neither was the eternal genera- 
tion of the Logos. 
The conception of a two-stage Logos which I have put for- 
ward proves useful in explaining several details of Milton's 
thought besides those which have been mentioned. Thus we 
find it as part of his description of the infernal trinity of 
Satan, Sin, and Death. As many critics have observed, the 
poet deliberately parallels or parodies various details of the 
holy Trinity in the unholy group. Thus Sin tells Satan that 
she originally existed as a thought in Satan's mind. Then at 
a point in time she was externalized as the "Goddess armd" 
who sprang from his head. She is conceived, that is, as a 
two-stage entity, emerging in time from a conceptual to an 
actual existence and inferior to her begetter. 
Another passage where the concept proves useful is that 
already mentioned at the beginning of Book 111, where MiI- 
ton invokes Light. We should notice at once that Milton 
hesitates in addressing Light over whether to call it "off- 
spring of heaven first born"-that is, the beginning of crea- 
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tion-or 'bf th'Eternal coeternal beamy'-that is, a being 
sharing in eternity with God. If we equate this divine Light 
with the Logos or Son, we may understand that Milton is 
deliberately playing upon the issue of wl~ether the true exist- 
ence of the Logos should be dated from the time when it 
became external to the Father or whether its first stage (from 
eternity) shows its true origin. The hesitation is easily under- 
standable in view of the two-stage theory of the Logos which 
I have already elaborated. 
But by what right may we assume that Milton had the 
Logos-Son in mind when he invoked Light there at the begin- 
ning of Book III? Is this an arbitrary and unwarranted forc- 
ing of a theory into the pattern of the poem? Again the 
church fathers may help us. It happens that the establish- 
ment of a clear meaning for any abstract principle is a diffi- 
cult thing to achieve in an argument. Analogy (or, to give it 
its poetic title, metaphor) frequently serves to clarify a diffi- 
cult issue in the mind of the listener. Thus it happens that I 
have presented the two-stage Logos theory almost entirely 
in the abstract and it is undoubtedly a difficult conception 
to comprehend in this way at first hearing. The Apologists 
had similar difficulty in explaining the relationship of the 
Father and Son: they wished to assert that both were divine 
beings (and so to be worshipped) but at the same time they 
wished to assert their digerence (and thus to support a genu- 
ine Trinity rather than a single deity existing in three differ- 
ent aspects). In order to make clear the meaning of the Mys- 
tery of the relationship between Father and Son they hit 
upon two metaphors especially, Justin Martyr first brings for- 
ward the image of the sun and its light, developirig the idea 
from Biblical suggestions. The Father in this analogy is the 
Sun; the Son is the Light. The Son, he accordingly says, has 
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power "'indivisible and inseparable from the Father, just as 
they say that the light of the sun on earth is indivisible and 
inseparable from the sun in the heavens."12 Hippolytus con- 
tinues the sun-light image and adds to it a simile comparing 
the Son to a flowing stream and the Father to its source in a 
spring or fountain: "When I say another [God, i.e., the Son], 
I do not mean that there are two Gods, but it is only as light 
of light, or as water from a fountain, or as a ray from the 
sun."13 It should be remembered that MiIton hesitated to 
address the Light as "Bright effluence of bright essence in- 
create"; or, he wonders, "hear'st thou rather pure Ethereal 
stream, /Whose Fountain who shall tell?" We must assume 
that Milton means that the stream is the Logos and the Foun- 
tain the Father. Since the Father is completely transcendent, 
"Who can tell" anything about him, the Fountain? Later in 
Book 111 the angels hymn the Father as "Fountain of Light, 
thy self invisible / Amidst the glorious brightness where thou 
sit'st" (lines 375-6). 
The collocation of the image of sun-light with fountain- 
stream continues in the Latin fathers with the same meaning. 
Thus Lactantius argues that the Father and Son cannot be 
separated: "the former is as it were an overflowing fountain, 
the latter as a stream flowing forth from it: the former as the 
sun, the latter as it were a ray extended from the sun." Or 
again, they cannot be separated-"just as the stream is not 
separated from the fountain, nor the ray from the sun: for the 
water of the fountain is in the stream, and the light of the 
sun is in the ray."14 Tertullian uses the same images with the 
addition of another from a tree and its roots: the unity of 
God in the Son is declared, he says, '"just as the root puts 
forth the tree, and the fountain the river, and the sun the ray. 
. . . I should not hesitate, indeed, to call the tree the son or 
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offspring of the root, and the river of the fountain, and the ray 
of the sun." These images he finds useful to explain the unity 
of the Trinity: 'the tree is not severed from the root, nor the 
river from the fountain, nor the ray from the sun; nor, indeed, 
is the Word separated from God. Following, therefore, the 
form of these analogies, I confess that I call God and I'is 
Word-the Father and His Son-two. For the root and the 
tree are distinctly two things, but correlatively joined; the 
fountain and the river are also two fonns, but indivisible; so 
likewise the sun and the ray are two forms, but coherent 
ones." Tertullian then argues from these analogies to affirm 
the subordination which is inherent in them: "Everything 
which proceeds from something else must needs be second to 
that from which it proceeds, without being on that account 
separated."15 
A further reason why these fathers used the sun-light 
metaphor to express the mystery of the Trinity lies in-its 
currency in contemporary Judaism and neoplatonism. We 
have seen that Plotinus was arguing at this time that the One 
emanates into Mind, the neoplatonic equivalent of the Logos. 
The process, he argues, "may be compared to the brilliant 
light encircling the sun and ceaselessIy generated from that 
unchanging substance."16 Other neoplatonists echo this meta- 
phor. At an earlier period, Philo presents the Jewish God as 
being, he says, "His own light. For the eye of the Absolutely 
Existent needs no other light to effect perception, but He 
Himself is the archetypal essence of which myriads of rays 
are the effluence, none visible to sense, all to the mind."17 
Elsewhere Philo asserts that God "is not only light, but the 
archetype of every other light, nay, prior to and high above 
every archetype, holding the position of the model of a 
model. For the model or pattern was the Word [Logos] 
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which contained all His fullness-light, in fact; for, as the 
lawgiver tells us, 'God said, "let light come into being" ' (Gen. 
1 :3)."'s One may paraphrase Philo that when God uttered the 
words "let there be light," the Logos or saying or Word came 
into existence as light. Small wonder that some interpreters of 
Milton's lines have confused the Logos with the physical 
light of the first day of creation. Milton takes full advantage 
here of the ambivalence of meaning. 
These allegorical rays of Philo may in addition be sent 
"forth from heaven into the mind of man. For while there is 
abiding in the soul that most God-like and incorporeal light, 
we shall restore the reason which had been given in pledge 
. . . to get the full benefit of the divine gift, and to enjoy 
calm repose through the presence of a counsellor and de- 
fender so true, so sure never to abandon the post in which he 
has been stationed."19 For his part, Milton invokes the Light 
to "Shine inward and the mind through all her powers / Ir- 
radiate." Also in Paradise Regained the inner force of Light 
as a power revealing the Father's will is again stated in terms 
of the fountain-stream image: '11e who receives / Light from 
above, from the fountain of light, / No other doctrin needs" 
(IV, 288 ff .). 
Finally, the invocation to Light in Book I11 continues into 
the implication that the Light was somehow present at the 
creation: 
Before the Heavens thou wert, and at the voice 
Of God, as with a Mantle didst invest 
The rising world of water dark and deep, 
Won from the void and formless infinite. 
Apparently Light was active in connection with the creation 
of the six days. The implication is that the Light interpreted 
as Logos or Son was the active agent. Without entering into 
a discussion of Milton's conception of the Son as the active 
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agent of the Father, we may remark that the Christian Doc- 
trine considers that "God the Father produced every thing 
that exists by his Word and Spirit" (XV, 5) and then goes on 
to identify the Spirit with the Father's power rather than 
with a person. I believe that the Logos-Son is the active 
agent of creation in Milton's thought. 
In conclusion, let me summarize my view of these complex 
matters. First, Milton was no Arian, though he gladly em- 
braced subordinationism. For him the second and third per- 
sons of the Trinity are inferior to the first. In one sense the 
Son has existed as the unexpressed Logos of the Father from 
all eternity. In another sense he came into existence "in the 
beginning." Milton never under any circumstances questions 
whether the Son is divine. Paradise Lost expresses substan- 
tially the same view. In Book I11 he hails Holy Light as either 
"offspring of heaven first born" or as "coeternaf' with the 
eternal. That he has in mind the Son in this passage is made 
clear by the fact that he associates the two images of sun- 
light and fountain-stream in exactly the same way as they 
had been used by post-apostolic Christians who tried through 
these images to express what the Christian Trinity means. 
Within the bounds of poetic and religious metaphor Milton 
seems to me to have been entirely successful, even though he 
has confused his modern interpreters. For my part, I find it 
an interesting problem as to whether I have expressed Milton 
unblamed.20 
WILLIAM B. HUNTER, JR. 
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